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Rhode Island Civil Procedure - Some
Problems
Robert B. Kent*
INTRODUCTION
"Law must be stable and yet it cannot stand still."1 That is
true of civil procedure. Substantial change in that field came to
Rhode Island in 1966. After a history of division of civil actions be-
tween law and equity and general adherence to the English sys-
tem brought to these shores with colonization, in 1966 Rhode
Island adopted the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure (the
Rules) modeled upon the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (the
Federal Rules).2 Amendments to the Rules in Rhode Island were
infrequent between 1966 and 1995, a period in which the 1966
rules were regularly applied and interpreted by the Supreme
Court of Rhode Island.3
During this period numerous sets of amendments to the Fed-
eral Rules were adopted, widening the gap between the two sets of
rules. 4 There also arose perceptions that problems with the Rules
needed attention. This attention came in the early 1990s through
a process of review under the leadership of the Superior Court
* Distinguished Visiting Professor of Law, Roger Williams University
School of Law. I am grateful to Allen G. Bowman, Larry D. White and Mi-
chael E. Siedlecki for valuable help in preparing this piece.
1. ROSCOE POUND, INTERPRETATIONS OF LEGAL HISTORY 1 (1923).
2. The Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure were promulgated on
June 9, 1965, and effective on January 10, 1966. See 1 ROBERT BRYDON KENT,
RHODE ISLAND PRACTICE: RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE WITH COMMENTARIES
§ 1.2 (1969).
3. Rule 4 was amended in 1972, Rule 49 in 1973, Rule 23 in 1991, and
Rule 30 in 1992.
4. Federal Rule amendments appeared seven times between 1966 and
1993. See FED. CIV. JUD. P. & R., 24-35 (West 2003).
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Bench Bar Committee. This review eventually culminated in a
substantial revision of the Rules in 1995.
The ensuing eight years have witnessed, perhaps inevitably,
the appearance of some problems in the system, some occasioned
by flaws in the Rules as drafted and adopted, some, in the view of
this observer, by unfortunate decisions of the Rhode Island Su-
preme Court in its application and interpretation of the Rules.
Having served as reporter to the original project from 1962 to
1966 and to the committee (termed "the working group"), which
prepared and recommended the 1995 revision, I here propose a
brief critique both of the Rules and court decisions concerning
them.
Before going into detail, it seems desirable to remind briefly of
the history of the rule-making process in Rhode Island. The 1966
Rules were promulgated by the justices of the superior court pur-
suant to section 8-6-2 of the General Laws of Rhode Island. This
enabling act departed from the Federal Rules Enabling Act and
most state enabling legislation which conferred rule-making
power on the supreme courts of the respective governments. 5 The
Rhode Island Enabling Act, in its broadest form, was adopted in
1940.6 It conferred the power on the justices of the superior court,
and the 1966 reform was the product of that court. In 1969 an
amendment to section 8-6-2 made the Rules thereafter adopted
by the trial courts subject to approval of the supreme court.7 Pri-
mary responsibilities, however, would remain with the trial
courts.
II. TEXTUAL PROBLEMS WITH THE RULES
1. Failure to Obtain Timely Service of Process; Consequences.
Prior to 1995 Rhode Island case law established the conse-
quences of a plaintiffs failure to obtain service of process. The
leading case was Caprio v. Fanning and Dooley Construction Co.8
Rule 4(b) then stated: "The plaintiffs attorney shall deliver to the
5. At the time the Superior Court Rules were adopted, Delaware was
the only other state conferring broad rule-making power upon its trial courts.
KENT, supra note 2, § 1.2.
6. 1940 R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 943, § 1.
7. 1969 R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 239, § 2.
8. 243 A.2d 738 (R.I. 1968).
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person who is to make service the original summons upon which
to make the return of service and a copy of the summons and com-
plaint for service upon the defendant. . . ."9 Rule 4 did not pre-
scribe a specific time limit upon compliance. In Caprio the
plaintiff, on the last day of the two year period provided by the
statute of limitations, filed a complaint with the court against two
defendants.' 0 Nearly thirteen months later plaintiff issued a
summons against each defendant; service was made nearly four-
teen months after the filing of the complaint.1 The defendants
moved to dismiss for the plaintiffs failure to exhibit due diligence
in the prosecution of her action.12 Consequently, the superior court
dismissed the actions for want of prosecution. 13 The supreme court
affirmed, but for different reasons. That court held that the obli-
gation of the plaintiff to deliver process for service under Rule 4(b)
implicitly required that this be done within a reasonable time. 14
Failure to meet this requirement exposed the plaintiff to a discre-
tionary dismissal pursuant to Rule 41(b)(2) for "failure of the
plaintiff to comply with the rules." 15 Although not discussed in
Caprio, Rule 41(b)(3) provides: "[u]nless the court in its order of
dismissal otherwise specifies, a dismissal under this subdivision
(b). . . operates as an adjudication upon the merits."16
In 1995 the scene changed. Based on Federal Rule 4(m), itself
added by amendments in 1983 and 1993, Rhode Island adopted
Rule 4(1). Our Rule 4(1) effects two major changes. First, the stan-
dard of "reasonable time" is replaced by a specific period of 120
days. Unless the offending plaintiff can show good cause for fail-
ure to serve within that period, "the action shall be dismissed as to
that defendant without prejudice .... "17
Now to the remaining problem: surely a new action based on
the same claim would not be barred by the doctrine of res judicata,
given the "without prejudice" character of the judgment of dis-
missal. But what of the statute of limitations? Section 9-1-22 of
9. Id. at 740.
10. Id. at 739.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 740.
15. Id. at 740-41.
16. Id.
17. R.I. SUPER. CT. R. CIV. P. 4(1) (emphasis added).
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the General Laws of Rhode Island, a so-called "savings statute,"
provides as follows:
(ilf an action is timely commenced and is terminated in
any other manner than by a voluntary discontinuance, a
dismissal of the complaint for neglect to prosecute the ac-
tion, or a final judgment upon the merits, the plaintiff, or
if he or she dies and the claim survives, his or her execu-
tor or administrator, may commence a new action upon
the same claim within one year after the termination. 18
A judgment dismissing an action for failure to effect timely
service of process is not a "judgment on the merits," but is it a
dismissal "for neglect to prosecute the action"? That exception to
the statute was added in a 1965 amendment to section 9-1-22.19
It is difficult not to interpret "neglect to prosecute" as including
failure to observe the 120 day requirement of Rule 4(1). The only
Rhode Island case I can find which comes close to the point is Ca-
prio v. Fanning and Dooley Construction Co., discussed above. Re-
call that the superior court dismissed the case "for want of
prosecution." The supreme court treated its disposition of the case
"on other grounds." The court made no reference to section 9-1-
22. The question thus remained open. Again, should a dismissal
under Rule 4(1), added in 1995, for failure to obtain service of
process within 120 days following filing of the complaint, be
treated as a dismissal "for neglect to prosecute the action" within
the meaning of the savings statute? I believe it should and the
subsequent action, even if brought within one year following dis-
missal of the first action, should be subject to the applicable stat-
ute of limitations. But on January 9, 2004, the Supreme Court of
Rhode Island decided otherwise. 20
The case of Furtado v. LaFerriere involved an extreme viola-
tion of Rule 4(1).21 A personal injury action was filed "on the eve of
the expiration of the three-year statute of limitations."22 For
nearly three years thereafter the plaintiff failed to obtain service
18. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-1-22 (2003).
19. R.I. GEN. LAws § 9-1-22 (2003), amended by 1965 R.I. Pub. Laws ch.
55, § 6.
20. See Furtado v. LaFerriere, 839 A.2d 533 (R.I. 2004).
21. Id.
22. Id at 534.
RHODE ISLAND CIVIL PROCEDURE
of process upon the defendant, notwithstanding the defendant's
apparent amenability.23 The action was dismissed by the superior
court without prejudice pursuant to Rule 4(1).24 The plaintiff,
within one year after the dismissal, commenced a new action on
the same claim and promptly effected service of process.25 The de-
fendant sought and obtained from the superior court a summary
judgment on the ground of expiration of the statute of limita-
tions. 26 The supreme court, on appeal, reversed the judgment,
holding, per curiam, that the claim was preserved by the "savings
statute," the above quoted section 9-1-22.27 The court rejected de-
fendant's argument that the unexcused failure to comply with
Rule 4(1) constituted "neglect to prosecute," a textual exception to
the savings statute.28
The per curiam opinion involved two propositions. First, the
court equated the "neglect to prosecute" under section 9-1-22 with
"lack of prosecution" under Rule 41(b)(1).29 The latter provides for
dismissal where the lack of prosecution involves an action "pend-
ing for more than five years."30 Despite the differing language -
"neglect to" in the statute, "lack of' in the rule - the court consid-
ered them "functionally equivalent,"31 and restricted application of
neglect of prosecution" in the statute to the five year reference to
"lack of prosecution" in the rule.32 Justice Flanders's persuasive
dissent rejected this restricted reading of "neglect to prosecute"
and found such neglect in this long and unexcused failure to com-
ply with Rule 4(1).33
The other rationale in the per curiam opinion is that to hold
the violation of Rule 4(1), even in the circumstances of this case, a
"neglect to prosecute," negating application of the savings statute,
would undercut the "without prejudice" character of the dismissal
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 535.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 538.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id. at n.3.
33. Id. at 539-46.
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for violation of Rule 4(1). 34 In the words of the court, "[b]y denying
plaintiff the protection of the savings statute, the motion justice in
the second case effectively reassessed the ruling in the first case
and determined that dismissal should have been with prejudice." 35
The present writer respectfully disagrees. The designation of a
dismissal as "without prejudice" surely eliminates any res judicata
impact of the judgment. But as Justice Flanders cogently ob-
served, dismissal without prejudice "does not inoculate the claim
against a future dismissal on statute-of-limitations
grounds .... "36
This observer believes that remedial action is indicated on
two fronts. The per curiam opinion states that "we hesitate to de-
prive the plaintiff of [a] day in court, until the General Assembly
amends § 9-1-22."37
The failure without "good cause" to obtain service within 120
days can leave the plaintiffs second action subject to the statute of
limitations by adding to the exceptions to the savings statute "fail-
ure to obtain timely service of process."
Rule 4(1) itself needs attention. Adopted in 1995, it tracks the
1983 provision in Federal Rule 4(m). In 1993, the federal rule was
amended to accord the trial court broader discretion not to dismiss
for failure to obtain timely service even without good cause.38 The
advisory committee note suggests relief may be appropriate be-
cause the statute of limitations would bar a refiled action. It is de-
sirable that such discretion be exercised at the time dismissal of
the first action is sought, not through a rigid application of the
savings statute. An amendment to Superior Court Rule 4(1) to fol-
low the lead of the 1993 amendment of Federal Rule 4(m) seems
desirable.
34. Id. at 537.
35. Id. at 538-39.
36. Id. at 545.
37. Id. at 539.
38. Although serving as reporter to the 1995 Rhode Island rules project,
the author is at a loss to explain now why the 1993 version of Federal Rule
4(m) was not the model used.
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2. The Demand for Judgment (Rule 8(a)(2)) in Actions for
Personal Injury, Property Damage or Wrongful Death and the
Limit on Relief in Default Cases: Rule 54(c)).
Section 9-1-30(a) of the General Laws of Rhode Island pro-
vides:
[n]o complaint or pleading in an action of contract or tort
for personal injury, injury to property, or wrongful death
shall contain an ad damnum or monetary amount claimed
against any defendant or defendants; provided, however,
that in any action brought before the superior court, the
complaint shall state that the monetary amount claimed
is sufficient to establish the jurisdiction of the superior
court.
3 9
A 1995 amendment to Rule 8(a)(2) tracks this statute. While
providing that generally a claim for relief shall contain "a demand
for judgment for the relief the pleader seeks," it goes on to provide:
"[in an action for personal injury, injury to property, or wrongful
death, the pleading shall not state the amount claimed, but only
that the amount is sufficient to establish the jurisdiction of the
court."40 Form 9 in the Appendix of Forms, dealing with "com-
plaint for negligence," furnishes the model: "[w]herefore plaintiff
demands judgment against defendant in an amount sufficient to
invoke the jurisdiction of the court."41
A problem arises when the defendant defaults. Rule 54(c), en-
titled Demand for Judgment, provides: "A judgment by default
shall not be different in kind from or exceed in amount that prayed
for in the demand for judgment."42 Rule 55(b)(2) provides for entry
of a judgment by default by the court, not by the clerk, when the
amount claimed is not certain.43 A defaulting defendant who has
appeared is entitled to a written notice of a hearing to determine
the amount of damages. 44 Prudence, if not the text of the rule,
would seem to require such notice even to a defendant who is de-
faulted for want of any appearance. Assume that such a defendant
39. R.I. GEN. LAws § 9-1-30(a) (1997).
40. R.I. SUPER. CT. R. CIv. P. 8(a)(2).
41. Id. Form 9(2) (2003).
42. Id. 54(c) (emphasis added).
43. R.I. SUPER. CT. R. Civ. P. 55(b)(2).
44. Id. 55(b)(2).
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persists in not appearing. Given Rule 54(c), may the court, after
notice and an opportunity to be heard, render judgment in excess
of $5,000, the minimum provided by section 8-2-14 for invoking
the jurisdiction of the superior court in an action at law? The an-
swer must be yes, but there is a problem with Rule 54(c): its provi-
sion that a judgment by default shall not exceed the amount
prayed for, in this instance an amount "sufficient to invoke the ju-
risdiction of the court."
Of course, the judicial function includes not only the applica-
tion and interpretation of Rules, but also includes filling in the
blanks. The process is strained when a sensible solution involves a
stark departure from the language of a rule. Therefore, amend-
ment of Rule 54(c) seems in order.
3. Enlargement of Time: Rule 6(b) and Rule 50(b).
Rule 6(b) authorizes the court to enlarge periods of time pro-
vided by the rules, even after expiration of a time period.45 Rule
6(b) qualifies this authority by stating that "it may not extend the
time for taking any action under Rules 52(b), 59(b), (d), and (e)
and 60(b) ... ,"46 These exceptions follow the model of Federal
Rule 6(b), except that the Federal Rule also prohibits enlargement
of the ten day period for action under Rule 50(b), renewing a mo-
tion for judgment as a matter of law following a verdict.47 This ref-
erence to Rule 50(b) is not in the Rhode Island version of Rule
6(b).48 This omission occurred in the original Rhode Island Rule
because the text of that Rule rendered the exception inapplica-
ble.49 With Rule 50(b) amended in 1995, Rule 6(b) should refer to
it.
The 1995 departure from the Federal Rule was inadvertent. It
is anomalous to say that the court may not extend the ten day pe-
riod for moving for a new trial (Rule 59(b)) and yet to permit
enlargement of the ten day period for renewal of a motion for
judgment as a matter of law. Admittedly, the matter is not earth
shaking. I can find no case in which the superior court has
45. R.I. SUPER. CT. R. CIv. P. 6(b).
46. Id.
47. FED. R. Civ. P. 6(b).
48. R.I. SUPER. CT. R. Civ. P. 6(b).
49. As originally written, Rule 50(b) did not provide for renewed motion
for a directed verdict.
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enlarged the time for a renewed motion under Rule 50(b), but
would urge that, when the rules are next amended, Rule 6(b)
should include a motion under Rule 50(b) on the list of motions for
which the time may not be enlarged.
III. INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF THE RULES: SOME
CRITICISMS
As noted earlier, from 1940 to 1969 the superior court's exer-
cise of its rule making power was not subject to supreme court ap-
proval.50 Since 1969 it has been subject to that approval. 51 During
both periods, however, the ultimate authority upon the application
and interpretation of court rules lies in the supreme court. The
cases are legion. What follows is a critique of a few such supreme
court decisions.
1. Motion for new trial after jury verdict on ground of error of law
occurring at the trial: requiring the motion as a condition for
appeal.
Until 1995 Rhode Island law did not recognize error of law oc-
curring at trial as a ground for granting a new trial motion in a
case tried to a jury. Unique to Rhode Island, this dated back at
least to the Court and Practice Act of 1905.52 Such errors could be
corrected only through appellate review in the supreme court after
timely objection in the trial court.53 Even the new Rules in 1966
did not alter this.54
Change came in 1995 when "error of law occurring at the
trial" was added to the grounds on which the trial court could or-
der a new trial under Rule 59(a). Amica Insurance Company v.
Tashjian was an early application of the amended rule.55 The
court quite properly reviewed the denial of a new trial motion on
the ground of claimed error in instructing the jury.56 The instruc-
tions were upheld, but the court ordered a new trial for an error
50. See supra Introduction.
51. Id.
52. R.I. GEN. ASSEM., The COURT AND PRACTICE ACT (1905).
53. Bernat v. DeGasparre, 129 A.2d 545 (1957).
54. See KENT, supra note 2, § 59.6, at 443-44.
55. 703 A.2d 93 (1997).
56. Id. at 94.
2004]
438 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 9:429
not assigned in the motion for a new trial.57 After the jury had re-
tired, it requested the judge to have some testimony read back.58
The judge dealt with this request in the absence of counsel for the
parties.5 9 The supreme court upheld the appellant's claim that this
was error necessitating a new trial.60 The court then addressed the
consequences of appellant's failure to include this ground in his
motion for a new trial. It stated that "errors of law not first pre-
sented to the trial justice in a jury tried case in a motion for a new
trial will not be permitted to be later raised in this Court for the
first time on appeal."61 In the instant case the court excused the
oversight because the issue arose only four months after the 1995
change for the first time included error of law occurring at the
trial as a ground for a motion for a new trial.62
There is ambiguity here. If an appellant does not object to a
ruling at the time it is made, the Court's exclusion of the matter
on appeal appears warranted. 63 But the Court's dictum is broader
and appears to require a motion for a new trial raising the alleged
error, even if there had been an objection to the trial court's action
at the time it was taken.64
Federal practice is clear. If objection was noted at the time the
alleged error was made, it may be renewed in a motion for a new
trial, but it need not be as a precondition to appeal.65 This is
sounder than the approach in Amica. If counsel believes there is
no chance of persuading the trial judge of having committed error,
there should be no barrier to appellate review without a motion
for a new trial.
57. Id. at 97.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 95.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. In Amica contemporaneous objection was not possible because the ac-
tion was taken in the absence of counsel. 703 A.2d at 96-97; R.I. SUPER. CT. R.
Civ. P. 46.
64. Amica Mut. Ins. Co., 703 A.2d at 97.
65. 11 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE,
§ 2818 (2d ed. 2004) and cases cited; 12 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE'S
FEDERAL PRACTICE 59.55 (3d ed. 2004) and cases cited.
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2. New Trials in Non-Jury Cases: Grounds; Tolling the Time for
Appeal from Judgment.
As discussed above, the granting of new trials in jury cases
now encompasses errors of law occurring at the trial as well as the
other traditional grounds for granting new trials in such actions,
thus bringing Rhode Island law into harmony with that of other
states. In non-jury cases, whether classifiable as at law or in eq-
uity, the picture is more complex.
Rule 59(a) provides that a new trial may be granted, "in an
action tried without a jury, for any of the reasons for which re-
hearings have heretofore been granted in suits in equity in the
courts of this state."66 Thus, the old equity standard for granting
rehearings governs in all non-jury actions, whether legal or equi-
table in character. Much turns on what circumstances the modern
supreme court finds its predecessors treated as grounds for a re-
hearing in equity in the years prior to the 1966 procedural merger
of law and equity in Rhode Island.
The key case is Colvin v. Goldenberg decided in 1971. 67 The
action was one seeking damages for personal injury and tried
without a jury. The trial judge found for the plaintiff and awarded
damages. The defendant's motion for a new trial was denied and
the defendant appealed. The precise grounds for the motion, other
than newly discovered evidence, were unclear. "At most the defen-
dant's motion amounted to a rehash of the evidence adduced at
the trial."68 The court found no adequate new evidence presented
and affirmed the judgment.69 The significance of the case lies in
the court's discussion of the place of the new trial motion in a non-
jury case. The scholarly opinion of Justice Kelleher discussed the
equity precedents in detail, noting that cases generously treating
grounds for rehearing arose prior to transfer of equity trial juris-
diction from the supreme court to the superior court in 1905.70
The matter was put succinctly in Shepard v. Taylor in 1887.71
The case of Hodges v. Soren Co., decided in 1853, has al-
66. R.I. SUPER. CT. R. CIv. P. 59(a).
67. 273 A.2d 663 (1971).
68. Id. at 669.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 667-69.
71. 16 R.I. 166 (1887).
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ways since then been regarded as settling the practice in
this state in regard to the rehearing of suits in equity on
petition. The court then decided that a rehearing would
be granted, upon petition, by the court in its discretion, if
it thought the case ought to be reheard, even when the
error alleged was simply error of law, and the court added
that the discretion should be exercised liberally in favor
of a rehearing. 72
Colvin treated these precedents as inapposite because of the
shift of trial jurisdiction to the superior court in 1905. It then
turned to federal precedents in applying Federal Rule of Civil Pro-
cedure 59(a), and concluded therefrom that the trial judge in a
non-jury case "may grant a new trial only if he finds a manifest
error of law in the judgment previously entered or if he is satisfied
that the newly discovered evidence was not available at the first
trial and is of sufficient importance to warrant a new trial."
73
In applying Colvin the supreme court has emphasized its ri-
gidity by elaborating the rule to require allegation of "a manifest
error of law on the face of the record without further examination
of matters of fact or evidence ... ." 74 The strict view of Colvin
sharply diverges from modem federal practice. Moore's Federal
Practice observes that "[a] new trial may be granted in a non-jury
action if a new trial might be obtained under similar circum-
stances in a jury action."75 There is a recognition that in a non-
jury case the motion "should be based on a manifest mistake of
fact or error of law; the court should find substantial reasons for
setting aside judgment."76 Wright, Miller & Kane, Federal Practice
and Procedure, observes "the concept of a new trial under Rule 59
is broad enough to include a rehearing of any matter decided by
the court without a jury."77 It goes on to caution that "a motion for
a new trial in a non-jury case or a petition for rehearing should be
based upon a manifest error of law or mistake of fact, and judg-
ment should not be set aside except for substantial reasons."78
72. Id. (citation omitted).
73. Colvin, 273 A.2d at 669.
74. Tillson v. Feingold, 490 A.2d 64, 66 (R.I. 1985).
75. MOORE, supra note 65, % 59.13[31 [a].
76. Id.
77. WRIGHT, supra note 65, § 2804, at 51.
78. Id.
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It seems clear that the term "manifest error" in the federal
sense involves clear error, but the court is not restricted to the
"face of the record" as emphasized in Rhode Island.79
Suppose the following: During the course of the trial the judge
makes a ruling on the admissibility of evidence which is arguably
very wrong and which infects the judgment. If the case were tried
to a jury, the error of law occurring at the trial is now a ground for
a motion for a new trial. I find no compulsion in the rules for a dif-
ferent approach if the case is tried without a jury, whether in its
nature it is legal or equitable. The motion for a new trial is a use-
ful device. There is nothing in classical equity practice which calls
for a narrow view of that device in a non-jury case.
The narrow view of grounds for a new trial in non-jury cases
has a collateral consequence of significance. The lawyer who
moves for a new trial on grounds not recognized by the supreme
court runs the risk of forfeiting the right to appeal to correct the
alleged error. Rule 4 of the Supreme Court Rules of Appellate Pro-
cedure provides that a notice of appeal must be filed with the clerk
of the trial court within twenty days of the date of the judgment.8 0
That rule goes on to provide that the time for filing an appeal is
terminated by a timely motion in the superior court made under a
number of superior court rules, including a motion for a new trial
under Rule 59.81 The full time for appeal from the judgment com-
mences to run again from the order ruling on the motion.8 2
In the case of Tillson v. Feingold, a breach of contract action
was tried by the superior court without a jury. 83 The court ren-
dered judgment for the plaintiff in the amount of $8,207.84 The de-
fendant moved for a new trial "purportedly" pursuant to Rule
59(a)(2). The grounds were that the court's findings of fact and
conclusions of law were "clearly erroneous."8 5 The motion was de-
79, Although both MOORE and WRIGHT, MILLER & KANE state that new
trials for a non-jury trial should be based on an error of law, mistake of fact,
or new evidence, they start by emphasizing that trial courts have broad dis-
cretion in granting a new trial.
80. RI Sup. CT. R. APP. P. 4(a).
81. Id. 4(a)(4).
82. Id. 4(a).
83. 490 A.2d 64 (R.I. 1985).
84. Id. at 65.
85. Id. at 66.
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nied.8 6 An appeal was denied on the ground that the motion for a
new trial was a "nullity" for failure to assert either of the grounds
recognized in Colvin.87 Because the case was of first impression,
the supreme court considered the substantive grounds of appeal
and found them without merit.88 The significance of the case lies
in the following:
We do caution members of the bar that in the future the
filing of a motion for a new trial in a non-jury case that
does not conform to the requirements of Colvin, supra,
will be regarded as a nullity and such a motion will not
extend the time for the filing of a notice of appeal.8 9
The lesson is clear; unless one relies on newly discovered evi-
dence, a motion for a new trial in a non-jury case must allege
manifest error. But one could be wrong in claiming that a clearly
erroneous ruling is "manifest on the face of the record." "[T]o toll
the running of the time for filing a notice of appeal, one must not
only comply with the timeliness provision but one must also set
forth the proper grounds for a new trial, which grounds are to be
found in Rule 59 of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure." 90
Certainly, a good faith attempt to set forth a valid ground for
a new trial should be a condition to tolling the time for appeal. If
such good faith is present, the motion should not be treated as a
nullity because the grounds asserted do not meet the unduly strict
test of Colvin.
3. The Renewed Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law - Its
Relationship to Appellate Review.
In a case tried by jury, suppose the defendant moves for
judgment as a matter of law at the close of all the evidence. The
trial judge denies the motion and submits the case to the jury.
Verdict and judgment are for the plaintiff. Though clearly author-
ized to do so by Rule 50(b), the defendant fails to renew the motion
for judgment as a matter of law. Rather, defendant appeals from
the judgment, assigning as error the denial of the motion for
86. Id.
87. Id. at 67.
88. Id. at 66.
89. Id. at 67.
90. Town of Glocester v. Lucy Corp., 422 A.2d 918, 919 (1980).
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judgment made at the close of the evidence. May the defendant do
this? The answer in federal court is no,91 in Rhode Island it is yes
under Skaling v. Aetna Insurance Co. 92
The Supreme Court of Rhode Island recognized that:
[t]he corresponding federal rule has long been interpreted
to require renewal of the motion after judgment is en-
tered in order to preserve an issue for appeal. After care-
ful consideration, we have concluded that we shall not
apply this interpretation to the Rhode Island rule. In-
stead we hold that if a motion for judgment as a matter of
law was made at the close of all the evidence, the motion
is sufficiently preserved for review by this Court.93
In a host of cases, the Rhode Island Supreme Court has fol-
lowed federal precedents in interpreting parallel provisions of the
Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure, especially where the lan-
guage is identical to the federal rule.94 As to why the departure
here "after careful consideration," the opinion in Skaling does not
opine.95
One may draw guidance from the history of Rule 50(b). In
1960, the superior court adopted what was then Rule 46(a) of the
Rules of Practice of that court. It read:
(a) Reservation of Decision on Motion. Whenever a motion
for a directed verdict is made at the close of all the evi-
dence, the Court may reserve decision on said motion sub-
ject to a later determination and if decision is reserved
the Court shall submit the action to the jury. When the
jury is discharged the Court shall forthwith enter a deci-
sion on the motion reserved whether or not the jury re-
turned a verdict.96
91. Cone v. West Virginia Pulp & Paper Co., 330 U.S. 212, 218 (1947).
92. 742 A.2d 282 (R.I. 1999).
93. Id. at 287 (citing Cone v. W. Va. Pulp & Paper Co., 330 U.S. 212
(1947)).
94. E.g., Plushner v. Mills, 429 A.2d 444 (R.I. 1981) (Rule 4(d)(1)); Hall v.
The Ins. Co. of N. Am., 727 A.2d 667 (R.I. 1997) (Rule 15); Kelvey v.
Coughlin, 625 A.2d 775 (R.I. 1993) (Rule 30(c)).
95. See generally Skaling, 742 A.2d at 282.
96. R.I. SUPER CT. R. P. 46(a) (amended 1960).
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In 1966, this rule was preserved as Rule 50(b). Its aim was to
enable the trial judge to defer a ruling on a motion for a directed
verdict until after the jury had rendered a verdict. If the judge
were disposed to grant the motion, deferral operated to place in
the record a jury verdict. In the event a reserved motion for a di-
rected verdict was granted after verdict for the plaintiff, reversal
by the supreme court did not lead to a new trial. Rather the ver-
dict was there as the basis for a final judgment in the case.
The 1995 amendment recast Rule 50(b) in the image of the
Federal Rule. "Judgment as a Matter of Law" was substituted for
"Directed Verdict" as a matter of nomenclature.97 The new rule
preserved the trial judge's option to postpone the ruling on a mo-
tion challenging the legal sufficiency of the evidence until after the
verdict is received, either by denying the motion or simply not
granting it.98 The moving party renews the motion for judgment as
a matter of law and the court rules thereon.99 The change brings
the Rule into closer harmony with federal practice, a salutary by-
product of the Rules ever since the use of the Federal Rules model
in 1966.100 To equate the practices here, however, requires more
than adoption of the language of the Federal Rule. It requires ad-
herence to at least clear interpretation and application of the Fed-
eral Rule by the federal courts. In this instance it would mean
requiring the renewal of the motion as a condition of appellate re-
view of the action denying the motion when initially made at the
close of the evidence. The advisory committee, which recom-
mended the 1995 amendment to Rule 50(b), recognized this. Its
note, appended to the new rule, stressed the change in Rhode Is-
land practice. That committee note reads in part: "IRIenewal of
the motion after verdict is essential if the defendant desires appel-
late review of the judge's failure to render judgment as a matter of
law at the close of all the evidence."1o1 The Skaling decision ren-
ders that note inaccurate for Rhode Island, however correct as a
statement of federal practice under an identically worded rule.
The loss perceived here is in the flexibility of the trial judge in
handling motions for judgment as a matter of law. If the ruling
97. See R.I. SUPER. CT. R. Civ. P. 50 committee note.
98. See R.I. SUPER. CT. R. CIV. P. 50(b).
99. Id.
100. The Rhode Island Supreme Court comments often on this similarity.
101. R.I. SuP. CT. R. CIV. P. 50(b) (amended 1995) committee note.
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presents difficulties, the judge may well want to delay decision un-
til after a verdict is returned. The judge may well deny the motion,
virtually pro forma, knowing that upon renewal of the motion af-
ter verdict time and effort in deciding will be invested in a context
of importance. Ironically, that flexibility existed under the prior
superior court rule. 10 2 It also exists under the federal approach to
the amended rule. 0 3 It is dubious, however, under Skaling, for the
trial judge cannot be certain that the defendant will renew the
motion, rather than accept the supreme court's invitation to ap-
peal from the judgment, assigning as error the pre-verdict denial
of the motion. This in effect requires the trial judge to decide the
issue with care before submitting a case to the jury, rather than
usefully postponing that decision until after the jury has returned,
with or without a verdict.
4. Discovery of Tax Returns; Limits Imposed by the Rules
Enabling Act.
With the adoption of the 1966 Superior Court Rules of Civil
Procedure came a focus on the scope of pre-trial discovery. Supe-
rior Court Justice Frank Licht, presiding over the motion calendar
in the period following adoption of the Rules, became the foremost
applier of the discovery rules. In a thoughtful piece, Judge Licht
reviewed the discovery rules and discussed particular problems
thereunder.'0 He indicated that only a clear showing of need war-
ranted disclosure of tax returns and added that in many cases
production of a W-2 Form would suffice. 0 5
Judge Licht wrote his piece in 1966. Legislation followed in
1975, when section 8-6-2 of the General Laws of Rhode Island,
the Rules Enabling Act, was amended to include the following:
each respective court shall not in said rules of procedure
require a party to produce either by discovery, motion to
produce or interrogatory an income tax return, W-2
statement, or copies thereof.106
102. See KENT, supra note 2, § 50.3, at 371, 372.
103. See FED R. CIrv. P. 50(b).
104. Frank Licht, Observations on Some Aspects of the Discovery Provi-
sions of the New Rules, 3 R.I. BARJ. 1, 6-7 (1966).
105. Id.
106. 1975 R. I. Pub. Laws ch. 222, §. 1.
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In DeBiasio v. Gervais Electronics Corporation plaintiff, pur-
suant to an employment contract, sought a bonus based on twenty
percent of defendant's net profits.'0 7 To determine the amount of
such profits, plaintiff requested copies of defendant's income tax
returns for the years in question and moved to compel produc-
tion.108 The superior court ordered production. 1 9 On review by
writ of certiorari, the supreme court affirmed, rejecting defen-
dant's contention that the statute represented a "clear declaration
that income tax returns are not discoverable."11o
The court recognized that the Enabling Act makes clear that
"no court can promulgate a rule of practice which requires a party
to produce tax returns."'' Nevertheless, the court, over dissent,
upheld the order.112 The opinion stated: "We do not believe, how-
ever, that the statute speaks to the individual judge who, in an
appropriate factual context, decides that justice would be best
served by requiring a party to produce his income tax returns."113
As the dissent pointed out, there is nothing in the statute to pre-
vent a trial judge from ordering production of tax returns for trial
by way of a subpoena." 4 Discovery, however, is another matter.
Authority to order production in that context rests squarely on
Rules 26 and 34, which in turn are grounded in section 8-6-2. 115
The clear legislative purpose is to prevent orders, pursuant to
court rule, to produce tax returns in the context of discovery." 6
Inherent power to do so is indeed hard to find. From 1966, author-
ity for the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure has been un-
derstood to stem from the Enabling Act. 17 This case flouts that
understanding.
107. 459 A.2d 941 (R.I. 1983).
108. Id. at 942.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 943.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 944.
115. R.I. SUPER. CT. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1), 34 (b)(1) (2003).
116. See R.I. GEN. LAws § 8-6-2 (1999); DeBiasio, 459 A.2d at 942.
117. See KENT, supra note 2, § 1.2.
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5. Motion to Vacate Judgment Under Rule 60(b): Limits
The case of Jackson v. Medical Coaches is instructive not only
for its treatment of the 1995 amendment adding Rule 4(1), but also
because it involves important holdings on Rule 60(b) and its limi-
tations. 18
Jackson commenced an action against two defendants, alleg-
ing products liability, negligence, strict liability and breach of
warranty causing personal injury. 1 9 The defendants moved to
dismiss the action for failure to effectuate service of process until
more than four months after commencement of the action, an un-
reasonable delay in doing so. 120 The trial judge dismissed the ac-
tion as to both defendants with prejudice. 12' It is apparent that all
involved were unaware that the 1995 adoption of Rule 4(1) pro-
vided for dismissal without prejudice when, in the absence of good
cause, process is not served within 120 days after commencement
of the action. 122
In 1997 plaintiff filed a second action, idntical to the first,
against the same defendants. 123 Defendants moved for summary
judgment on the ground of res judicata and the statute of limita-
tions. 24 While granting that motion the judge stayed entry of
judgment to accord plaintiff an opportunity to move for vacation of
the earlier judgment. 25 The plaintiff so moved. 126 The judge va-
cated the judgment and entered a new one, dismissing the first ac-
tion without prejudice.27 Review in the supreme court evoked a
substantial treatment of the judge's authority to do so.
The Court discussed several provisions of Rule 60(b) and
found none of them applicable. 28 The ground of mistake, pursuant
to Rule 60(b)(1), does not apply to erroneous rulings of law by the
judge. 29 An erroneous judgment is not "void" within the meaning
118. 734 A.2d 502 (R.I. 1999).
119. Id. at 503.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. See id.; R.I. SUPER. CT. R. CIV. P. 4(1).
123. Jackson, 734 A.2d at 503.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 503-04.
128. Id. at 505-06.
129. Id. at 507.
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of Rule 60(b)(4). 130 As for Rule 60(b)(6), "any other reason justify-
ing relief from the operation of the judgment," the court repeated
an earlier admonition that the provision "is not intended as a
catchall." 131 The court quoted the present writer as stating "that
the circumstances must be extraordinary to justify relief."132
Mild disagreement here rests upon a belief that the circum-
stances were "extraordinary." This was the first occasion on which
the court held, and correctly so, that Rule 4(1) dictates dismissal
without prejudice for failure to serve within 120 days, thus over-
ruling earlier precedents calling for dismissal with prejudice for
unreasonable delay in obtaining service of process. 33
At the time of the first Jackson suit, Rule 4(1) was, at most, a
few months old. It had not been interpreted or applied by the su-
preme court. The court has been generous in granting substantive
review notwithstanding counsel's procedural missteps in following
brand new requirements. 3 4 Circumstances in this case warranted
a determination that there were "extraordinary circumstances"
justifying vacation of the judgment under Rule 60(b)(6). 135
6. Rule 15(c) and Relation Back of Amendments Changing
Plaintiffs
In Balletta v. McHale the Supreme Court of Rhode Island held
that an amendment to add a spouse's claim of loss of consortium
to a personal injury action does not relate back to the filing of the
original claim for statute of limitations purposes.136 The per cu-
riam opinion holds that Superior Court Rule 15(c), relative to rela-
tion back of amendments "changing the party," applies to a party
"against whom a claim is asserted."137 Addition of a party assert-
ing a claim is not within the language of this provision. 138 How-
130. Id. at 506.
131. Id. at 505 n.3.
132. Id. at 505 (quoting Bendix Corp. v. Norberg, 404 A.2d 505, 506 (R.I.
1979)).
133. Id.
134. See, e.g., Arnica Mutual Ins. Co. v. Tashjian, 703 A.2d 93, 97 (R.I.
1997).
135. Jackson, 734 A.2d at 505 (quoting Bendix Corp., 404 A.2d at 506
(quoting KENT, supra note 2, § 60.8, at 456)).
136. Balletta v. McHale, 823 A.2d 292, 295 (R.I. 2003).
137. Id. at 294.
138. Id.
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ever, there is substantial support for holding that the change of
plaintiffs is consistent with Rule 15(c) as a whole. The first sen-
tence of which reads: "Whenever the claim or defense asserted in
the amended pleading arose out of the conduct, transaction, or oc-
currence set forth or attempted to be set forth in the original
pleading, the amendment relates back to the date of the original
pleading."139 The next sentence, relating to change of party
"against whom a claim is asserted," 40 is based on a 1966 amend-
ment to Federal Rule 15(c) adopted to cure a problem regarding
change of defendants and relation back.' 4 ' The advisory committee
note reads in part, "The relation back of amendments changing
plaintiffs is not expressly treated in Rule 15(c) since the problem
is generally easier. Again the chief consideration of policy is that
of the statute of limitations, and the attitude taken in revised
Rule 15(c) toward change of defendants extends by analogy to
amendments changing plaintiffs." 42
The reporter's note to Superior Court Rule 15(c) makes the
same point. 43 The departure in Balletta can be cured by amend-
ment of Superior Court Rule 15(c) to make specific reference to
amendments changing claimants.
7. Waiver of Time for Appeal
Previously discussed for its impact on Rule 4(1) and Rhode Is-
land General Law section 9-1-22, the recent case of Furtado v.
LaFerriere144 also involved a troublesome application of Superior
Court Rule 58 and its relation to the time of appeal. Rule 4(a) of
the Rhode Island Supreme Court Rules of Appellate Procedure
provides for filing a notice of appeal with the clerk of the trial
court "within twenty (20) days of the date of the entry of the
judgment...". .1 45 The entry of judgment in the superior court is
governed by Rule 58 and its requirement that "[e]very judgment
139. R.I. SUPER. CT. R. Crv. P. 15(c).
140. Id.
141. Id. 15(c) reporter's note.
142. FED. R. Civ. P. 15(c) advisory committee note.
143. R.I. SUPER. CT. R. Civ. P. 15(c) reporter's note. See also 1 KENT, supra
note 2, § 15.6 at 154.
144. 839 A.2d 533 (R.I. 2004).
145. R.I. SuP. CT. R. APP. P. 4(a).
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shall be set forth on a separate document."146 Furtado poses the
problem. The motion justice ordered summary judgment on Au-
gust 9, 2001.147 The order for summary judgment was entered on
September 5, 2001, but no judgment was then entered. 148 Only
when the defendant later moved for entry of judgment was a final
judgment entered on June 27, 2002.149 On July 10, 2002 the plain-
tiff filed the notice of appeal. 150 When did the appeal period begin
to run, from September 5, 2001, the date of entry of the order, or
from June 27, 2002, the date of entry of judgment on a separate
paper? The Supreme Court of Rhode Island held in its per curiam
opinion that the appeal time ran only from June 27, 2002.151 The
court recognized that under a 2002 amendment to the parallel
Federal Rule 58, the judgment is entered when set forth on a
separate document or "when 150 days have run from the entry in
the civil docket."15 2 The Rhode Island per curiam accurately points
out that such language does not appear in Superior Court Rule
58.153
Justice Flanders also dissented on this issue. 54 He pointed
out that the 2002 amendment to Federal Rule 58 represented a
codification of an earlier approach by the First Circuit establish-
ing "a clear rule that waiver of the right to judgment entered on a
separate document will be inferred [when] a party fails to act [to
cause the entry of a judgment on a separate document] within
three months of the court's final order in a case."15 Application of
that proposition in Furtado would have led to dismissal of the ap-
peal as untimely. The court made clear its adherence to the man-
datory requirement of a separate document with no waiver "unless
and until Rule 58 is amended."156 Such amendment appears desir-
able.
146. R.I. SUPER. CT. R. CIv. P. 58(a).
147. Furtado, 839 A.2d at 535.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 536.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 539-43.
155. Id. at 540.
156. Id. at 536-37.
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8. Appeals from Interlocutory Orders: "The McAuslan Doctrine"
The basic rule of appealability in Rhode Island is set forth in
section 9-24-1 of the Rhode Island General Laws, which author-
izes an appeal to the supreme court for a final judgment, decree or
order of the superior court.157
Appeals from a limited number of interlocutory orders and
judgments are appealable pursuant to section 9-24-7.158 These are
the granting or continuing of an injunction (including a prelimi-
nary injunction), 159 the appointment of a receiver, an order for the
sale of property or an order granting a new trial after trial by
jury.160
An additional occasion for appeal from a non-final order is of
judicial creation, the so-called "McAuslan Doctrine." The case was
McAuslan v. McAuslan.161 As the Rhode Island Supreme Court
said:
Besides those provided for in the statute, other instances
may present themselves of decrees, in a strict sense inter-
locutory, which by reason of their possible injurious con-
sequences require an immediate review, and must be held
for this reason to have such elements of finality as to
permit an immediate appeal. 162
This case has been cited to and its doctrine applied many
times. 163
Inevitably, the question arose as to whether failure to take an
appeal from an order appealable under the McAuslan doctrine
precluded appellate review of such order after final judgment. The
157. R.I. GEN. LAws § 9-24-1 (1997).
158. Id. § 9-24-7.
159. See Paramount Office Supply Co. v. D.A. MacIsaac, Inc., 524 A.2d
1099, 1101 n.1 (R.I. 1987) ("We note that the grant of a preliminary injunc-
tion is appealable.... however, the denial of a preliminary injunction is not."
(citation omitted)).
160. R.I. GEN. LAws § 9-24-7 (1997).
161. 83 A. 837 (R.I. 1912). See also Sheer Asset Mgmt. Partners v. Lauro
Thin Films, Inc., 731 A.2d 708, 710 (R.I. 1999) (affirming the continuing va-
lidity of the McAuslan doctrine).
162. McAuslan, 83 A. at 841.
163. See KENT, supra note 2, § 73.4.
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court answered the question clearly in Acme Finishing Co. v.
Greenville Finishing Co. 164:
As this exceptional right or privilege to take an immedi-
ate appeal in order to prevent irreparable injury, rather
than because of the strict finality of the decree, is allowed
to the party aggrieved for his benefit and to prevent in-
justice, such party may elect to make his appeal forth-
with, or to take the appeal in the regular course, and a
failure to take such an immediate appeal does not deprive
him of his right to an appeal from the decree to which ob-
jection is made at the termination of the proceedings in the
superior court. 165
A cloud on this sound determination appeared in Jolicoeur
Furniture Company v. Baldelli.166 In a complex case involving an
alleged contract of a city to sell land, the plaintiff relied upon a
number of theories, some legal, some equitable.167 Both parties ini-
tially demanded trial by jury. 168 When the plaintiff moved for
separate trials on different issues, the trial court ordered separate
trials and that issues of both liability and specific performance be
tried by the court without a jury.169 Without further objection the
court proceeded to do So. 17 0 Following an adverse judgment, the
defendants claimed denial of their constitutional right to a jury
trial. 171 The supreme court held that the claim of jury trial had
been waived and, inter alia, that the defendants' failure to appeal
from the order for a separate trial to the court alone precluded
raising that issue on appeal from the final judgment.172
There was probably ample reason for finding the waiver, but
the one ground relied upon was unfortunate. The court, without
citing McAuslan, stated that:
The... order of the Superior Court terminated the rights
of both parties to a jury trial on the issues of liability and
164. 111 A. 721 (R.I. 1920).
165. Id. at 722 (emphasis added).
166. 653 A.2d 740 (R.I. 1995).
167. Id. at 746.
168. Id. at 747.
169. Id. at 746.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 747.
172. Id. at 748.
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specific performance. Because a timely appeal was neces-
sary in order to prevent the "imminent and irreparable
harm" of being deprived a jury trial on the issues, the or-
der had the requisite element of finality. Yet defendants
failed to satisfy the "all-important condition precedent" of
filing an appeal within the twenty days of entry of the or-
der.173
This ignores the salutary decision in Acme that the immediate
appeal pursuant to McAuslan is an option of the appellant who
may choose to await the final judgment before seeking review of
the offending order.17 4
The result of Jolicoeur is to motivate careful counsel to appeal
immediately from orders even possibly meeting the McAuslan
standard of irreparable harm, lest failure to do so constitute loss
of any appellate review. As the court stated in Acme, "[t]o compel a
litigant in such cases to elect at his peril whether an immediate
appeal should be taken would probably result in the taking of ap-
peals in all doubtful cases in order to protect the right to an ulti-
mate appeal, thereby causing delay and unnecessary expense."175
One may hope that when faced with this issue again the court will
recognize that its approach in Jolicoeur represents an unfortunate
departure from the sound rule articulated in Acme.
In sum, the foregoing represents three contexts in which prob-
lems of procedure have arisen: flaws in the text of the rules cur-
able by amendments or statutory changes, unfortunate Rhode
Island Supreme Court interpretations, and judicially fashioned
doctrine which can be altered through persuasion of the court it-
self.
173. Jolicoeur Furniture Co., 653 A.2d at 748.
174. See Acme Finishing Co. v. Greenville Finishing Co., 111 A. 721, 722
(R.I. 1920).
175. Id.
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